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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES E. FREEGARD, 
Plaintiff-appellant, 
-vs-
FIRST WESTERN NATIONAL BANK, 
a corporation, 
Defendant-respondent. 
Case Nos. 19503 
19794 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
These cases are consolidated on appeal and involve claims 
by appellant Freegard that respondent, First Western National Bank, 
as an escrow agent, wrongfully endorsed over fire insurance proceeds 
belonging to appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In the first case (District Court Civil No. 4939), the 
District Court granted respondent's Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings on the basis that disposition of insurance proceeds was 
not within the scope of the bank's fiduciary duty under the escrow 
agreement and that appellant had failed adequately to allege 
negligence. Appellant took an appeal to this court from that 
decision and judgment. (Supreme Court No. 19503) . 
Appellant then filed a second suit (District Court Civil 
No. 5052) grounded in negligence, and the District Court dismissed 
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that case on Motion of respondent based on a claim res judicata and 
that respondent owed appellant no duty of due care. Appellant has 
also appealed from that decision and judgment (Supreme Court No. 
19794) . 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgments of the District 
Court in both cases, a finding that appellant has stated claims for 
negligence and breach of contractual duty and a remand with instruc-
tions to grant appellant a trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 13, 1978, appellant, as Seller, entered into 
a Uniform Real Estate Contract with Janice Campbell and David Clark, 
as Buyers, for the sale of a certain parcel of real property, including 
a house, in Grand County, State of Utah. (No. 19503, R. 4-5) 
The contract provided in part that the Buyers were to keep 
the premises insured in an amount not less than the unpaid balance 
owing on the contract. 
In connection with the sale, appellant, the Buyers and 
respondent, First Western National Bank (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Bank") executed an escrow agreement (No. 19503, R. 20-21) whereby 
the Bank would collect the payments under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract and credit them to appellant's account. 
On January 9, 1981, the house located on the subject property 
was destroyed by fire. 
-2-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Because the respondent First Western National Bank was 
erroneously listed as a loss payee instead of Appellant, the insurer 
paid the fire insurance proceeds to Clark and the Bank. The Bank 
endorsed the draft over to Clark, who used the funds to purchase 
two mobile homes, the titles to which he deposited in escrow with 
the Bank as substitute security for the Uniform Real Estate Contract. 
Appellant then filed the first suit, District Court Civil 
No. 4939, to recover the insurance proceeds. In a Complaint and 
Amended Complaint (19503, R. 1-10), Appellant based his claim 
against the Bank on a breach of fiduciary duty arising from the 
escrow agreement and, specifically, a clause contained in the 
agreement making the Bank liable for any damages caused by its 
"negligence or willful misconduct." 
The Bank answered and filed a Motion for Judgment on the 
pleadings and a Memorandum in Support (19503, R. 22-25), claiming 
that the Bank, based on the allegations of Appellant's pleadings, 
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The Court granted the Bank's Motion and rendered a 
judgment against Appellant for no cause of action. (19503, R. 30-33), 
Appellant filed an appeal from the Court's decision and 
judgment (19503, R. 34-35) and also filed a second action against 
the Bank grounded in negligence, (District Court Civil No. 5052) 
The Bank next filed a Motion to Dismiss Appellant's 
second suit, claiming it was barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata and on the theory that the Bank owed no duty of care to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ward appellant with reference to the insurance proceeds. (No. 19794, 
R. 10-19) 
Appellant filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Bank's 
Motion (No. 19794, R. 20-27) and the Court granted the Bank's Motion, 
dismissing appellant's Complaint with prejudice. (No. 19794, R. 32038) 
Appellant then filed an Appeal from the Court's judgment 
in the second case and on Motion of Appellant and Stipulation of Counsel, 
both cases have been consolidated on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT 
RESPONDENT OWED NO CONTRACTURAL DUTY TO 
PLAINTIFF CONCERNING DISPOSITION OF THE 
INSURANCE PROCEEDS 
In the first case, the District judge found that the Bank 
owed no contractural duty to appellant with reference to the fire 
insurance proceeds because the escrow agreement was silent on that 
point. 
Appellant contends that the District Court defined too 
narrowly the scope of the fiduciary duty owed by an escrow agent to 
its principals. 
It is a well established rule, conceded by the Bank in its 
supporting Memorandum in the first case, that an escrow agreement 
makes the depositary the agent of both the Buyer and Seller in a 
real estate transaction. Morris v. Clark, 100 Utah 252, 112 P.2d 153 
(1941) 
-4-
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The Bank's position, adopted by the District Court, 
postulated that the Bank was not liable for wrongfully endorsing 
over the insurance proceeds to Clark because the escrow agreement 
was silent as to disposition of insurance proceeds and, thus, the 
Bank owed no duty ot Appellant concerning the same. 
The Bank's theory is flawed in two respects. First, 
the escrow agreement itself clearly provides for liability for 
loss or damage caused either by the negligence or willful miscon-
duct of the Bank. That language does not limit its application 
only to the handling of matters which are specifically set forth 
in the escrow instructions. Second, an escrow depository is a 
fiduciary held to a higher standard of care in dealing with its 
principals, and is obligated not to exceed the authority vested in 
it by the escrow agreement. The depository will be held liable 
for any damages caused by exceeding such authority. 
In support of the first above-mentioned point, the 
escrow agreement provides as follows: "All funds collected on 
this escrow are to be distributed as follows," and further sets 
forth to whom the funds are to be paid. When the bank received 
and accepted the insurance check, the Bank had an obligation to 
treat the check as collected funds and disbursed it according to 
the escrow agreement. 
The fact that the insurance check did not specifically 
state "payment on contract" does not alter the fact that the 
insurance proceeds were funds to be used to apply to the balance 
-5-
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due the respondents as provided in the sales contract between the 
buyer and Respondent. 
The Bank became involved as a party to the insurance 
transaction because it was named a loss payee and was the escrow 
agent. Otherwise it would have been a stranger to insurance trans-
action. The actions of the Bank in accepting and endorsing the 
check to the Buyer were obviously pursuant to the duty the Bank 
considered itself to have pursuant to the escrow agreement. 
The case of National Bank of Washington v. Equity 
Investors, 81 T^ ash. 2d 886, 506 P.2d 20 (1973), which was relied 
upon by the Bank in its Memorandum to the District Court, actually 
supports Appellant's position on the second point mentioned above. 
The Court therein stated: 
Thus, it is the rule that an escrow agent or 
holder becomes liable to his principals for 
damage proximately resulting from his breach of 
the instructions, or from his exceeding the 
authority conferred on him by the instructTons. 
(Emphasis added) 506 P.2d at 35 
The fiduciary nature of the escrow relationship obli-
gates the depositary to act in strict compliance with its duties 
under the agreement. It constitutes a breach of the fiduciary 
duty to deviate from the terms of the agreement and the escrow 
agent is liable for all damages proximately resulting from such 
deviation. Tucson Title Insurance Co. v. D'Ascoli, 94 Ariz. 230, 
383 P.2d 984 (1962); Miller v. Craig, 27 Ariz. App. 789, 558 P.2d 
984 (1976). 
-6-
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The Supreme Court of Utah has adopted the position that 
an escrow agent which exceeds the authority of its escrow instruc-
tions is liable for damages caused to a principal. In W. P. 
Harlin Construction Co. v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 23 Utah 
2d 422, 464 P.2d 585 (1970), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed a 
judgment against an escrow agent who exceeded his authority by 
paying a claim other than the one for which the check in question 
had been delivered. 
Consequently, Appellant asserts that the Bank in this 
case owed a contractual, fiduciary duty to Appellant when it under-
took to exceed its escrow authority by disbursing the fire insur-
ance proceeds to one of the Buyers. Such a disbursement without 
checking to see who was the proper party to receive the proceeds 
constituted a breach of that fiduciary duty. 
As a result, the District Court erred in granting a 
judgment of no cause of action against Appellant in the first case. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT NO DUTY OF DUE CARE EXISTED 
SEPARATE FROM ANY CONTRACTUAL DUTY. 
In addition to finding that no contractual duty with 
reference to insurance proceeds arose from the terms of the escrow 
agreement itself, the district judge, in both the first and second 
written decisions, found that the Bank had not been negligent in 
handling the insurance proceeds on a theory that a duty of due 
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care would arise only if there x^ ere an express agreement in the 
escrow instructions concerning insurance proceeds. 
In the first written decision, the Court stated: 
Without some allegation of duty owed under the 
express agreement, there is no allegation of negli-
gence properly stated. (No. 19503, R. 31) 
That position x^ as mimicked in the District Court's writ-
ten decision in the second case wherein the Court stated: 
There is no mention of the existence of any insur-
ance or payment to be made in case of any loss and, 
therefore, no duty was created with regard to insur-
ance proceeds to which a standard of conduct could 
attach. (No. 19794, R. 34) 
The District Court's position on this issue fundamentally 
miscomprehends the law regarding negligence. The duty of exercising 
due care in a given situation does not depend for its existence on 
a co-extensive contractual right or obligation. 
The logic of the Court's position is such that a party 
injured by the negligence of an automobile driver could not recover 
for his injuries unless a contractual right or obligation existed. 
In fact, it is Hornbook law that the duty to exercise due care 
derives from the operation of the automobile itself and does not 
depend on any such contractual relationship between one driver and 
another. 
In the present case, assuming for the purpose of argument 
that no contractual duty existed, the duty of the Bank to exercise 
ordinary care arose from its undertaking to disburse the insurance 
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proceeds whether or not the escrow instructions covered such a 
matter. The failure of the Bank to ascertain, or even attempt to 
ascertain, the proper recipient of the funds amounts to a breach of 
the duty to exercise due care once having undertaken the task. 
The Oregon appellate court in the case of McDonald v. Title 
Insurance Company of Oregon, 49 Or. App. 1055, 621 P.2d 654 (1981), 
held that a volunteer is liable for its negligence. In that par-
ticular case a title insurer/escrow officer voluntarily chose to 
advise the insured plaintiffs on a matter outside the title 
policy or escrow instructions. The plaintiff claimed that, des-
pite an absence of contractual duty, once Defendants chose to 
give advise separate from the contract, they had a duty of exer-
cising reasonable care in providing such advice. Noting this 
type of claim involved the "rescue" doctrine, the court accepted 
the argument and found the title insurance company liable for the 
insureds1 loss. 
The Florida courts also find a duty in such circum-
stances. In Biadi v. Lawyers Title Insurance Co., 374 So. 2d 30 
(Fla. App. 1979), the court recognized: 
Although Florida law adheres to the general propo-
sition that the "escrow instructions" define the 
duties of the escrow agent, there must be consider-
ation as to further steps that were taken in this 
transaction which concern "additional" or "super-
seding" duties that could be construed to have 
been voluntarily undertaken by appellee-escrow 
agent and about which a jury should decide. 
Id. at 35. 
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The court overturned a Summary Judgment Order in the 
Biadi case and remanded the case to the lower court to determine 
whether or not the escrow agent acted with care and diligence when 
it acted voluntarily. A footnote to that instruction indicated 
the following negligence doctrine applied in that determination: 
There have been decisions in negligence cases where 
the allegedly negligent act, even though gratuitously 
undertaken, has been subjected to the standard of 
duty of due care. See Banfleld v. Addington, 104 
Fla. 661, 140 So. 893 (1932) and 6 ALR 2d 284. 
Id. at 35, F. N. 14 
A negligence action may exist entirely separate and apart 
from any contractual relationship which might exist between the 
parties. DCR Incorporated v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah, 
1983) Thus, even if this Court finds that the Bank breached no 
contractual duty to Appellant it may find that the Bank owed a duty 
of due care by volunteering to disburse the insurance proceeds. 
In fact, the Court in DCR Incorporated v. Peak Alarm Co., 
supra, extends the duty of due care even further when the parties 
involved also share a contractual relationship for performance of 
services. The Court stated: 
Similarly, contractual relationships for the per-
formance of services impose on each of the contract-
ing parties a duty of due care towards the other, 
apart from the specific obligations expressed in 
the contract itself. The care to be exercised in 
any particular case depends upon the circumstances 
of that case and on the extent of foreseeable dan-
ger involved and must be determined as a question 
of fact. 663 P.2d at 435 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is apparent that the District Court totally mis-
construed the law relating to negligence and Appellant is enti-
tled to a reversal and remand for trial on this point. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER 
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. 
As part of the Court's overall decision in the first 
suit, the Court found that a claim for negligence was not properly 
stated by Appellant; 
While Appellant felt that the Complaint and the Amended 
Complaint in the first suit adequately raised an issue of negli-
gence, in response to the above-mentioned portion of the Dis-
trict Court's ruling, Appellant filed the second suit, basing the 
claim solely on negligence. 
Assuming only for purposes of argument that the Dis-
trict Court was correct in finding that negligence was not plead 
properly in the first case, it was clearly erroneous for the Court 
to rule that the second suit was barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata. 
It must be noted that the Motion filed by the Bank in 
the first case was for a judgment on the pleadings. No affidavits 
or other material beyond the pleading and exhibits attached thereto 
were filed to save Memoranda which discussed only the matters 
raised in the pleadings. Consequently, the Court did not and, right-
fully, could not, treat the Motion as one for a summary judgment on 
the merits. 
1 1 
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Consequently, the District Court's assertion in the rul-
ing in the second suit that it "granted summary judgment against 
the plaintiff" in the first suit in incorrect. The Court dealt 
only with matters raised by the pleadings and could not convert 
that ruling to a summary judgment on the merits as the ruling in 
the second case purports to do. 
Where the Bank and the Court reached only the issue of 
a contractual duty, it was clearly improper for the District Court 
to bar the second suit on grounds of res judicata where the second 
suit was clearly based on a claim of negligence. 
Where the issue of negligence was not addressed in the 
Motion for Judgment on the pleadings, it was improper for the Court 
to grant the Motion to Dismiss under a theory of res judicata. 
The District Court relied in its dismissal of the second 
suit on the case of Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 P.2d 
946 (1962). However, the District Court ignored the language of 
Pearson, supra, limiting the application of res judicata as a bar: 
On the other hand, where the claim, demand or cause 
of action is different in the two cases then the 
former is res judicata of the latter only to the 
extent that the former actually raised and decided 
the same points and issues raised in the latter. 
376 P.2d at 947 
Such is precisely the case before the Court. The Dis-
trict Court in Appellant's first case construed the Complaint and 
the Amended Complaint as encompassing only a contractual issue and, 
because the Court did not, and could not, in its first decision, 
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treat the matter as a Motion for Summary Judgment, then the con-
tractual issue was the only issue decided by judgment on the 
pleadings. 
Consequently, the Court should have denied the Bank's 
Motion to Dismiss in the second case and allowed the case to pro-
ceed to trial. It was only the District Court's fundamental mis-
comprehension of the doctrine of res judicata and of the distinc-
tion between contractual duties and negligence theory that led 
to the onerous result of Appellant's not being permitted any 
remedy for the obvious mishandling of the insurance proceeds, 
which should properly belong to Appellant under the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant requests a reversal 
of the District Court's decisions and judgments in both cases and 
a remand for trial on both claims of breach of a contractual duty 
and negligence. 
DATED this ^ S day of April, 1984. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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